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'Jill'ailfrington, tB. QJ. 20ffeJ.l.~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

December 11, 1980

Re:

79-6027 - wood v. Georgia

Dear Lewis:
In my judgment your memorandum sets forth an
appropriate disposition of this somewhat unusual case.
My only suggestion of substance is that I am not sure
we should indulge in the speculation that this lawyer
was motivated by the employer 's interest in having a
test case on · this issue.
It seems to me you have
enough basis for questioning his fidelity to his client
without that speculation and I think it is perhaps too
far beyond the record to be appropriate.
Respectfully,

)~

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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Jfag4ittgfon. ~. <!J. 2llffe~,
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

December 11, 1980

Re:

79-6027 - Wood v. Georgia

Dear Lewis:

I.'

In my judgment your memorandum sets forth an
appropriate disposition of this somewhat unusual case.
My only suggestion of substance is that I am not sure
we should indulge in the speculation that this lawyer
was motivated by the employer's interest in having a
test case on this issue. It seems to me you have
enough basis for questioning his fidelity to his client
without that speculation and I think it is perhaps too
far beyond the record to be appropriate.
Respectfully,

)ik_

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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,ju;rumt C!Jo:ttd of iqt Jm±tb .itattsJktglrtttghtn. ~. QJ. 20ffe~~
CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

December 11, 1980

Re:

79-6027 - wood v. Georgia

Dear Lewis,
I

shall probably write

in this case; but even so,

separately
I

'
,.

..

may also

join you.
Sincerely yours,

·.

.. .•

..'

Mr. Justice Powell

'

•.'

Copies to the Conference
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'Ulaa-£rington. JO. QJ. 2llp)l.~
CHAMBEqS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

December 11, 1980

Re:

No. 79-6027 - Wood v. Georgia

Dear Lewis:
I agree with your memorandum.
Sincerely,

~·
T.M.

Justice Powell

,jnpuuu (!tltltrl 4tf tfyt ~ b .jhdts

._-ulfitt:gfon. ~. (!t. 2.llffe)l.~
CHAMBERS OF

December 17, 1980

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 79-6027 - Wood v. Georgia

Dear Lewis:
I have given careful consideration to your memorandum.
It seems to me that it proposes a proper way of disposing
of a troublesome case and, at the same time, preserves the
basic issue for review in the future in a better case.
I therefore would join an opinion prepared on the basis
of your memorandum.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

~nprttttt <!I'1ttri llf tlrt ~ t b ,jtaftg

-aslt"in!ltott. ~. <q.

2llffe)!'

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

December 18, 1980
Re:

No. 79-6027

Wood v. Georgia

Dear Lewis:
In the event your opinion becomes the opinion of
the Court, I will be happy to join it.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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Most of4tlanta.'s Pornography Shops to Clos~ in a Pact With·Prosecutor\
.

'

-----'-

· ,.

.

ATLANTA, Jan. 18 (AP)-Almost all
of Atlanta's adult bookstores and movie
theaters have agreed to clos~ in return
for dismissal of charges against their employees. A prosecutor hailed the bargain
as proof that "law enforcement now has
the upper hand" against pornography.
"If you need a dirty book, you'll have to
leave Atlanta to get it," said Gler.n Zell,
an attorney for the stores. ·
·
Mr. Zell said the owners of at least 16
adult bookstores had agreed Friday to
close if the Fulton County Solicitor General, Hinson McAuliffe, would dismiss all
charges against their employees. Leonan1 Rhodes, an assistant solicitor general, said this would leave one adult book-

,----------,----~
•

.... 1 •

•

store, three adult theaters and one peel)show still operating in Atlanta.
Employees at some of the bookstores
and theater.s'began packing their belongings as sales were being advertised at
many of the concerns. "We're tired of
fighting," said a worker at one of the
bookstores. "We're getting out of here."
Mr. Zell said bis clients had decided to
leave Fulton County. He said "hassles
with the police, fees for lawyers" and
higher rents had made "the marginal
profits for pornography . unbelievably
low." ~- · ·
·- · · ·
Under the agreement, the state will
withhold prosecution for six months. If
there is no attempt to resume operations

• •

•• -

by then, Mr. McAuliffe will seek to dis- lowed authorities to build up recon1s
miss about 40 cases against ~pl~ ,work- against the concerns as public nuisances,
ing in the businesses.
.
_ and they then began arguing in court that
· For the Solicitor General, the agree- they should be closed.
.
ment ended a long antipornography camMr. McAu!:ffe also obtained court orpaign, which had already reduced the ders clo~ing the lucrative "peep..show"
number of bookstores and theaters from sections of the bookstores, and filed peti44 about four years ago.
tions in United States District Court
_At first, deputies cited employees of the against what he called the "paper corpobusinesses for selEng pornography, per- rations" holding title to many of the
suading the courts to impose steadily stores.
higher fines, most of which were paid by
"I llave always felt that the people of
U·.e owners. Then the police began bring- ~ulton County wanted pornography baning charges against customers :Or such ished from the county, so I don't really
offenses as solicitation, sodomy and inde- feel vindicated," Mr. McAuliffe said.
cent exposure.
·
"The critics never bothered me anyRepeated prosecution_~~f customers al- way."
-
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

In light of Byron's memorandum circulated today, I
will make some changes in my memorandum that I hope will be
responsive.

~u.prttttt
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2Ilffe~~

C HAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 6, 1981
Re:

No. 79-6027

'.

Wood v. Georgia

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

(

1J'v'
Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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~as£rnghtn. ~- OJ. 2.llffe>¼~
CHAMBERS OF"

January 7, 1981

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

RE:

/

79-6027 - Wood v. Georgia
j·

Dear Lewis:

., -

I agree generally with your analysis and could join
a disposition along the lines you propose.

·'.

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 9, 1981

Re:

79-6027 - Wood v. Georgia

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

9/l_

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF
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.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

January 9, 1981
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Re:

No. 79-6027 - Wood v. Georgia

Dear Lewis:
This is a formal join in your opinion.

•.'i",.
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Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

~
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January 9, 1981

CHAMBERS OF"

'

···- '1

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re: No. 79-6027, wood v. Georgia

.,.
...

...".

Dear Lewis:

I join.

Rega~<J
Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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To: Tha Chief J us t i ce
Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Jus+ ice ~ t:e
t
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Recircu lJtJd : _ _ _ __ _

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffl
No. 79~6027

I

Raymond Wood et al., Petitioners, On Writ of Certiorari to ~ M.A.-L,.f
v.
the Court of Appeals of
- - \
State of Georgia.
Georgia.
~
[January -, 1981]

h1~

JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.
The Court's disposition of this case is twice flawed: first,
there is no jul'.isdiction to vacate the judgment on the federal
constitutional ground upon which the Court rests; second,
the record does not sustain the factual inferences required to
support the Court's judgment.

I
The petition for certiorari presented a single federal question: does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment permit a State to revoke an indigent's probation
because he has failed to make regular payments toward the
satisfaction of a line? This issue was pl'operly presented to
and ruled upon by the Georgia courts. No other federal constitutional issue was presented there or brought here. The
Court, however, disposes of this case on another ground, but a
ground that also involves a constitutional issue: the possibly
divided loyalties of petitioners' counsel may have deprived
petitioners of due process and their constitiutional right to
counsel. Thus, we are to avoid one constitutional issue in
favor of another, which was not raised by petitioners either
here or below. I do not believe that this Court has jurisdiction even to reach this question, nor do I see why we should
prefer one constitution! issue to allother, even if we had the
jurisdiction.
The Court, ante, at n. 20, suggests that the conflict of intetest issue was presented here by respondent, the State of

-----

_J__

W...e_ ~ , ~
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Georgia. But the State merely argued that petitioners' attorney was also the attorney for petitioners' employer who had
agreed to pay the fine and who was uow seeking to avoid
payment by arguing petitioners' indigency. Neither here nor
in the trial court has the State ever suggested that petitioner
was deprived of due process or raised any other federal constitutional issue. The State has surely not confessed error or
given any other indication that it is seeking anything but an
affirmance of the decision below-hardly an appropriate disposition if the State is suggesting that petitioners were denied
their constitutional right to counsel. Moreover, nowhere in
the passage of the response cited by the Court are the terms
"conflict of interest" used, nor is there even a clear suggestion
made that counsel was acting other than in the interests of
petitioners in arguing that an indigent's probation cannot be
revoked for failure to pay a fine.
However the State's argument here is to be characterized,
this case comes to us on writ of certiorari to a state court.
Our jurisdiction, therefore, arises under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (3)
and is limited here to federal rights and privileges that have
been "specially set up or claimed," and upon which there has
been a final decision by the highest state court in which a
decision could be had. The right to counsel claim was never
raised in the state court, nor did the state court ever render
a decision on the issue: There is, thus, a jurisdictional bar to
our reaching the issue. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U. S. 786, 799
(1972); Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 805 (1971); Cardinale
v. Louis'iana, 394 U.S. 437 (1969) , and cases cited there.
It is as clear as could be that no federal constitutional claim
of any kind was made in the state courts with respect to a
conflict of interest and the adequacy of pet:tioners' counsel.
At the revocation hearing, petitioners testified that they were
without funds to pay the fines, and their counsel urged that
to incarcerate them would violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. On cross-examination, peti~

79...(l027-DISSENT

WOOD
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3

tioners indicated that they had been assured by their employer
that the employer would pay employee fines if they were
convicted in cases such as this. The State's attorney then
asserted several times that there was a conflict of interest
because petitioners' counsel also represented petitioners' corporate employer and was being paid by that concern to
represent petitioners. 1 But far from suggesting that the
1

The following colloquy, similar to others, took place at one point in the
revocation hearing:
"MR. RHODES: Your Honor, I submit that actually what we have
here is a conflict of interest on Mr. Zell's part. He's rcpre:;enting the company and he's trying to get out of paying this money that the,;e people
expert that company to pay that money. Mr. Zell is here pnrportiug to
represent her while he legally repre::;ents a compauy that ha,; promii;ecl to
pay all these expenses and fines for the:;r people. And l would aHk the
Court to look into that and make a determination of that, and if necei;.,;ary,
see that tlicsc people have Counsel to enforce that agreement uetween
that company and these people.
"THE COURT: State font again now.
"MR. RHODES: Mr. Zell is here representing Mrs. Allen. Now, Mrs.
Allen C'ontends that that company promised to pay all this s::i that :;he
wouldn't have to go through all of this.
"Now they have not done it.
"And I submit that Mr. Zell represents that rompany. That he is, hi;;i
first allegiance is to that company, and not to Mrs. Allen.
"And that thPre's a conflict of interest, and thal this ought to be lookrd
into by this Court.
"THE COURT: You wbh to respond?
"MH. ZELL: I don't think it makes any S<'PSe what he's saying but
I will if the C'ourt want:a; me to. I don't think I'm required to.
"THE COURT: I don't know whether there':; anything the Court <'01tld
look into. What speeifically do you w,mt the Court to look iuto?
"MR. RHODES: Mr. Zell is here supposedly representing Mrs. Allen.
He ut the same time represents tlw people who promised to take care of
these things and lo pay these fines.
"Now tho:;e people are not doing i1. And they apparently have reneged
on it at this point. I think if you sent thet'e people out to the jail for a
while I think they would pay it berause they don't want the other employee~ to ~now that they are not taking care of these things when they

ff 6027-DISSENT
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alleged conflict was a ground of relief for petitioners, the
State suggested that petitioners and t.heir counsel had misled
the court into thinking that the employer would pay the
fines, and that the employer's undertaking should be enforced
by sending petitioners "out to jail for a while." 2 rather than
permit the employer to renege and free petitioners on equal
protection grounds. This would convince the employer to
pay because it would not want other employees to know that
they would not be taken care of in the event trouble arose. 3
In the course of these arguments, the State never mentioned
the Federal Constitution.
~
y in turn responded that although there
had been an advance arrangement between petitioners and
their employer that fines would be paid by the latter. the
employer had not paid, and the only issue was whether petitioners should go to jail when they were without funds themselves to pay the fines. He urged that jailing them would
violate the Equal Protection Clause.~ He als,o suggested that
come up ." Tran C'ript of Revocation Hra.riug (Tr.) 14-15. The transcript is an appendix to the response of respondent.
Other discussions appear at Tr. 25-27 and Tr. 27-28.
2 Tr. 15.
3 The State':-, position in this regard is clear from its response to the·
petition for certiorari:
"In fact, Respondent believes t.ha.t the Petitioners have no intention whatsoever in paying these finrs, as their testimony indicates that they are
of the opinion tha,t their rmployers should have paid thc1,e .fines. The
Petitioners are thus holding the enforcement of .fines as a recognized sentencing tool a. hostage because of 1heir beliefl:i that others should pay
their finel:i for them. By arguing at thi:; time that they are indigent they
are miing this as a shield to hide behind their responsibility to pay a fine,
which they earlier agreed to pay by virtue of Urnir silence which led the
sentencing court to conclude that they were able to pay these fines."·
Response of Respondent 10.
Elsewhere, the State sugge:;ted "that they be put out there iu jail and
start serving-that's the only way really 1 know to enforce the sentence·
at this point." Tr. 74.

~-Ts:. 16:-~.

=w'
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if the asserted conflict of interest raised an ethical problem
in the mind of the State's attorney, a complaint should be filed
with the state bar. 5
~he judge, apparently rejecting the equal protection claim,
revoked petitioners' probation, although petitioners have remained free on bond pending appeal. The sole issue in the
Georgia Court of Appeals was whether petitioners had been
denied the equal protection of the laws. That claim was
reJected, the judgment of revocation was affirmed and the
Georgia Supreme Court denied further review. The equal
protection issue, as I have said, is the only federal constitutional issue that has been presented here.
The Court apparently believes that under Cuyler v. S-ullivan the possibility of a conflict of interest of constitutional
dimensions should have prompted further inquiry by the trial
judge. But Cuyler v. Sullivan did not purport to give this
Court jurisdiction over a claim otherwise beyond its reach.
Cuyler held only that if a trial court "reasonably should know
that a particu ar conflict exists,
en a a1 ure to initia~ an
inqmry may constitu ea ,.ixth Amendment viol t·on. If this
is tl-ie case ere, t en petitioners remain free to seek collateral
relief in the lower courts. 0
A majority of the Court, however, proceeds on the basis
that it has jurisdiction to address the due process-adequacy
of counsel issue. Accordingly, I proceed on that assumption.

u
As I see it, the Court's disposition of the case rests upo11
critical factual assumptions that al'e not supported by the
1

-

~

Tr. 27: "I would suggest Mr. Rhodt>S report this to the Stale Bar of
Georgia and be glad at a heariug to testify if there is any impropriety and
submit to any questions before the ~tate Bar."
6 Rule 34, the plain error mle, gives us no authority to set. aside a state
court judgment by qealing with a rom,-titutional issue neither rai:;cd nor
decided in the state courts. Where an issue has been properly raised and
decided in state litigation but not raised here, Rule 34 would permit us
to reach that issue though not pr~ented by the parties here.

i

79--0027-DISSENT
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record. Certainly the mere fact that petitioners' counsel wa15
paid by their employer does not in itself constitute a conflict
of interest of constitutional dimension.7 Indeed, one would
expect that in the normal course of things the interests of
petitioners and of their empfoyer woufcl have corres >onded
thr_o~ ~ pr~e_!a~s. t wou d have been just as much
the employees' interest to have had
in the employer's
the employees adjudged innocent. Similarly, assuming that
the employer had promised to pay whatever fines might be
levie<l against the employees, it was in the employer's iutcrest,
just as it was in their interest, to have these fines set at the
lowest possib1e amount. · The conflict of interests, therefore,
t')nly emerges by assuming that the employer. the owner of an
adult bookstore and a movie theater, set out to con struct a
eonstitutional test case and the petitioners' counsel repreeented the employer in this regard. ~ot even a decision to
pursue a test ca.se, however, would in itself create a conflict
of interest. One must assume further that it was for the
1ake of this interest that the employer decided not to pay
ihe fines and for the sake of this interest of the employer
that petitioners' attorney did not object to the siz:e of the
Ines or move in time1y fashion for a modification of the con~
ditions of probation.
I recogniz·e that the Court's conclusion relies oul upon the
"possibility"
of this scenario, but I nd these assumptions
___,
implausible and would requite a much stronger showing than
this record reveals before I would speculate on the likelihood
of such a motive of the employer and the knowing cooperation
of counsel to this end, let alone dispose of the case on that
basis. 8 First, since the only submission of petitioners was

as m

1

Although petitioner:;' counsel admitted at oral nrgument that he hnd
been paid by petition cr<i' employer at the time of trial, he indicated that
the payment:;; from the employer ended al lite time petit iouers were put
on probation . Tr. 13-16.
& fethioners' attorney abo said that " I want the court to know, .am:I

N--6027-DISSENT
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that they should not go to jail for failure to pay their fines,
even if the court sustained their position, their liability on
the fine would remain-as would that of the employer if it had
an enforceable obligation to pay. It is, therefore, difficult to
find any interest that the employer might have in litigating
a test case on this issue through the Georgia courts and to this
Court. Second, the record suggests two much more plausible
explanations of the employer's failure to pay the fines, neither
of which implies a conflict of interest: The employer may
have reneged on its promise to pay fines because petitioners
were no longer working for the employer, or it may have
reneged because ownership of the establishments changed
hands. 0 The fact that the employer may have continued to
meet some of the expenses, but did not pay the substantial
fines, does not indicate to me that the employer manipulated
the situation to create a test case; more likely, the employer
reneged on his promise because, given the change in circumstances of both the employer anathe petitioners, the expense
was simply greater than that which the employer was willing
to bear at tlus poin .

~

A4

r
. ,J

~

'"

Mr. Rhodes to know that I've attempted at least was asked, to get the
fines paid. And of course, you can see the result of it.
I told the three defendants I would represent them to the best of my
ability, and I've explained this to the defendants, and I would like to make
an explanation to the court." Tr. p. 68.
Interesting also is tbe following exhange from the cross-examination
ef one of the petitioners:
"Q Did you select Mr. Zell as your attorney?
"A Yes, sir. I've 1rnown him a long time and I trust him. And he's
the only lawyer I've ever had to have in my life, and yes, sir, I selected
him."
As far as this record reveals, none of the petitioners to this date has complained about the legal representation.
9
There iB" no indication in the record that the employer owned other
"adult" e8tablishments. If, ru:, counsel suggested at oral argument, ownership has in fact changed hands, then it seems unlikely tht.t,t the ex-<.'mployer
would continue to be interested in creating and litigating a test case in a
matter wifb which he is no longer coucerneq.

79-6027....:DJSSENT
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If the employer was simply unwilling to pay the fines, then.
the arguments advanced by the attorney may very well have
been the best and only arguments available to petitioners. 10
Indeed, the employer having failed to pay, counsel would have
been derelict not to press the equal protection claim on behalf
of his indigent clients. Obviously, success on this ground
would have advantaged petitioners; and I fail to see. as
apparently the trial court failed to see, Tr. 15, 28, how petitioners will be constitutionally deprived by assertioll of the
equal protection claim, The fact that petitioners did move,
although belatedly, for a modification of the conditions of
parole 11 further indicates that the employer was more iuterested in cutting his costs than creating a test case. 12 On
this record, therefore, I believe it necessary to reach the substantive question that we granted certiorari to resolve.

III
Although I think that there are circumstances in which a
State may impose a suitable jail term in lieu of a fine wheµ
the deferidant cannot or will not pay the fine, there are con10

Note that petitioners argue in fheir response that the trial court was
fully aware of their financial situation. Response for Petitioners, at 2.
This is amply supported by the record. Petitioners' attoruey conceded
that a defendant w'ho has been fined and w110 himself could pay the fine
could not hide behind the vromi::Je of another that t1ie latter -would pay .
The point was, however, that these petitioners were indigent and could uot
themselves pay. Tr. 69.
11 The fact that this motion was ma.de and rejected suggests that ~
remand to the tria1 court to reconsider th'is issue is not IJ°ke1y to lead to
a different result.
12 Even this b'tatement asserts ·m ore than t11e evidence of record supports: other than t11e asse-rt'ions of t'he 'State's attorney in a colloquy with
1he judge at lhe -revocation -hearing, there is no suggestion in t'his record
that the employer directed this litigation in any wa.y. The fact that counsel was paid for some period by the employer, does not support an inference that coun,;cl was repre ·enting the interest:, of the employer rather
than tbose of 1>ctitioncrs. See ABA Model Code of Professional R e:,pon~

.eibillty, D, R 5-107 (B).
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stitutional limits on those circumstances, and the State of
Georgia has exceeded the limits in this case.
In Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) , Williams, convicted of petty theft, received the maximum sentence of oneyear's imprisonment and a $500 fine (plus $5 in court costs).
As permitted by Illinois statute, the judgment provided that
if, when the one-year sentence expired, Williams did not immediately pay the fine and court costs, he was to remain in
jail a length of time sufficient to satisfy the total debt, calculated at the rate of $5 per day. We held that "the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that
the statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for any substantive offense be the same for all defendants irrespective of
their economic status." 399 U. S., at 244. Therefore, the
Illinois statute as applied to Williams, who was too poor to
pay the fine , violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971), involved an indigent
defendant incarcerated for nonpayment of fines imposed for
violating traffic ordinances. Under Texas law, traffic offenses
were punishable only by fines, not imprisonment. When Tate ·
could not pay $425 in fin es imposed for nine traffic convictions,
he was jailed pursuant to the provisions of another Texas
statute and a municipal ordinance that required him to remain in jail a sufficient time to satisfy the fines, again calculated at the rate of $5 per day. We reversed on the authority of Williams v. Illinois, saying: "Since Texas has legislated a fines only policy for traffic offenses, that statutory ·
ceiling cannot, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause,
limit the punishment to payment of the fine if one is able to ·
pay it, yet convert the fine into a prison term for an indigent
defendant without the means to pay his fine." 401 U. S., at
399. The Court, however, was careful to repeat what it had ·
said in Williams : " [T]he state is not powerless to enforce
judgments against those financially unable to pay a fine" ·
&,ncl is.Jr~e to choose other means to effectuate this end. Ibid..

79-6027-DISSENT
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In Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S., at 243, the Court empha..
sized that its holding "does not deal with a judgment of
confinement for non-payment of a fi!}e in the familiar pattern
of alternative sentence of $30 or 30 days." In neither Williams nor Tate did it appear that "jail [ was] a -rational and
necessary trade-off to punish the individual who possesses no
accumulated assets-since the substitute sentence provision,
phrased in terms of a judgment co1lection statute, [did] not
impose a discretionary jail term as an alternative s0ntence,
but rather cquate[d] days in jail with a fixed sum." Williams v. Illinois, supra, 399 U. S., at 265 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result). As ·both the Court and justice Harlan
implied, if the Court had confronted a legislative scheme that
imposed alternative sentences, the ana1ysis would have· been
different.
Indigency does not insulate those who have violated the
criminal law from any punishment ,vhatsoevcr. As I see it,
if an indigent cannot pay a fine, even in installments. the
Equal Protection Clause does not bar the State from specifying
other punishment. even a. jail term, in lieu of the fine. 13 · To
comply with the Equal Protection Clause, however, the State
must make clear that the specified jail term in such circumstances is essentially a substitute for the fine and serves the
same purpose of enforcing the particular statute that the
defendant violated. In both Williams and Tate the State violated this principle by speaking inconsistently: "In each case,
· the legislature drclarea its interest in penalizing a particular
offense to be satisfi.e'd by a specified ja1l term (in ·rate, no jail
13 In imposing an alternative srntence the state focuses on the penalty
appropriate for the particular offense and structures two punishments,
rach tailored to meet the State's ends in responding to the offense committrd. Such tailoring may consider the financial situation of the ·defend:rnt , Williams v. New York , supra, 337 U. S, at 246-250, but it does
so only in the context of structuring a penalty appropriate to the offense

committ ed.
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term at all) and at the same time subjected the indigent
offender to a greater term of punishment.
The incarceration of the petitioners in this case cannot be
distinguished from that which we found to be unconstitutional
in Williams and Tate. Here, the State imposed probated
prison terms and fines, but made insta11ment payment of the
fines a condition of probation: Had the fines been paid in full
and other conditions of probation satisfied, there would have
been no time in jail at all. Thus, the ends of the State's
criminal justice system did not call for any loss of liberty
except that incident to probation.
Under these circumstances, the State's only interest in incarcerating these petitioners for not paying their fines was to
impose a loss of liberty that would be as efficacious as the
fines in satisfying the State's interests in enforcing the criminal law involved. However, no calculation like that was
made here. Upon nonpayment, probation was automatically
revoked and petitioners were sentenced to their full prison
terms. 14 There was no attempt to provide, in addition to the
jail terms for which they were given probation, a term of
imprisonment that would be a proper substitute for the fines.
In fact, even at the conclusion of their prison terms, petitioners
will apparently be liable for the unpaid fines. This is little
more than imprisonment for failure to pay a fine, without
regard to the goals of the criminal justice system. As in
Will-iams and Tate, the State is speaking inconsistently concerning the necessity of imprisonment to meet its penal objectives; imprisonment of an indigent under these circumstances is constitutionally impermissible.
This case falls well within the limits of what we meant to
prohibit when we announced in Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395
11 As the majority opinion makes clear, the fines were quite heavy, perhaps in anticipation of payment by the employer. There was no expectation that these defendant:;, if they performed well on probation, W<1lllld
:<ierve any time in jail, let alone a long tenra.
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(1971), that the "Constitution prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting
it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent/ 1
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment,

